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In this paper, we investigate the degree of real economic interdependence between 
emerging Asia and major industrial countries to shed light on the heated debate over the 
“decoupling” of emerging Asia. We first document the evolution of macroeconomic 
interdependence for emerging Asian economies through changing trade and financial 
linkages at both the regional and global levels. Then, by employing a panel vector auto-
regression (VAR) model, we estimate the degree of real economic interdependence 
before and after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Empirical findings show that real 
economic interdependence increased significantly in the post-crisis period, suggesting 
“recoupling”, rather than decoupling, in recent years. Output shocks from major industrial 
countries have a significant positive effect on emerging Asian economies. More 
interestingly, the reverse is also true. Output shocks from emerging Asia (and the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC]) have a significant positive effect on output in major 
industrial countries. The result suggests that macroeconomic interdependence between 
emerging Asia and industrial countries has become “bi-directional,” defying the 
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The economies of emerging Asia
1 are becoming increasingly interdependent. Foremost 
among the drivers of regional integration is intra-regional trade. The share of 
intraregional trade as a percentage of emerging Asia's total trade increased significantly 
over the last decade. Emerging Asian economies are also increasingly integrated 
through direct investment, financial flows, and other forms of economic interaction. And 
intensifying regional economic integration provided a backdrop for the hypothesis of 
“decoupling” which attracted much attention in the years prior to the current crisis.
2  
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 has reshaped the debates of "decoupling". It is no 
longer about the question of whether emerging Asia can weather a US slowdown or 
global recession. Precipitous falls in exports and production across emerging Asia in 
response to a sharp decline in demand in major industrial countries was a solemn 
reminder that the region's rapidly integrating economy remains strongly tied to the fate of 
the global economy. Nevertheless, the issue of decoupling remains highly contentious. 
In a narrow scope, it is now a question of whether emerging Asia can manage an 
independent recovery from the impact of the global financial crisis and recession. But in 
a broader sense, it is relevant to the changing nature of macroeconomic 
interdependence between emerging Asia and the rest of the world as Asia’s economic 
prowess grows and regional integration progresses. In particular, with the region's large 
economies, especially China, continuing to grow positively on relatively resilient 
domestic demand, the question is whether emerging Asia's positive growth can help 
facilitate the global recovery and, if so, how much.  
The rise of emerging Asia is changing the landscape of the world economy. On the back 
of strong growth and rapidly integrating regional trade and production linkages, emerging 
market economies in Asia as a group have become a key player in the global economy. 
The region now exerts significant influence in global markets as a producer of 
manufacturing goods and consumer of many primary commodities. Rapid financial 
globalization is another force behind ever-rising economic interdependence between 
emerging Asia and the world. The growing influence of Asia and the PRC, tightening 
intra- and inter-regional trade linkages, and the globalization of financial markets are 
making fundamental changes to the nature of macroeconomic interdependence and 
economic spillovers between emerging Asia and major industrial countries. 
Emerging Asia accounted for 18% of total world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 
(on a purchasing power parity basis), compared to 9% in 1990 (Figure 1). Over the past 
several decades, emerging Asia has shown remarkable economic progress and has had 
a profound impact on the world economy. In the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian financial 
crisis, emerging market economies in Asia have maintained an average annual growth 
rate of 7.5% over the period 2000–2007. Underpinning this performance has been 
dynamic growth in the PRC, which has contributed more than four percentage points per 
                                                           
1  Throughout this paper, emerging Asia refers to nine selected economies in East and South East Asia. 
The nine Asian economies include China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, 
Republic of; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. 
2  See survey in section 2. 2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
dynamic growth in the PRC, which has contributed more than four percentage points per 
annum to Asian growth during the same period.  
The emergence of the PRC has been one of the most important features reshaping the 
world economy. The PRC is now the sixth largest economy in the world (at market 
exchange rates) and the fourth-largest global trader. The Chinese economy has 
accounted for about one fifth of incremental demand in the world economy in recent 
years. Given the prominent economic role played by emerging Asia, particularly the 
PRC, the impact of emerging Asian economies on the global business cycle is of 
particular interest.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the evolution and nature of macroeconomic 
interdependence between emerging Asia and major industrial countries such as the 
group of seven (G7) economies. With increasing economic integration and the growing 
influence of emerging Asia in the world economy, the pattern of global macroeconomic 
interdependence is evolving. The macroeconomic interdependence and growth 
spillovers between emerging Asia and major industrial countries appear to have become 
“bi-directional”, rather than “uni-directional”. In addition, if Asian shocks are positively 
transmitted to global shocks, Asian shocks can be another source of positive co-
movement between emerging Asia and major industrial countries. In other words, 
emerging Asia and major industrial countries can be “recoupling”, with positive spillovers 
from emerging Asia to major industrial countries. It would be interesting to investigate 
whether the direction and magnitude of growth spillovers between emerging Asia and 
the world reflect such changes.   
To shed light on such issues, we first document changes in inter-regional and intra-
regional economic linkages, such as trade and financial market linkages, and report 
various business cycle co-movement statistics between emerging Asia and major 
industrial countries. To assess the evolution of macroeconomic interdependence and to 
measure bi-directional macroeconomic impacts between emerging Asia and G7 
economies, we employ a panel vector auto-regression (VAR) model. To the best of our 
knowledge, there has been no systematic empirical research addressing the level of bi-
directional  macroeconomic interdependence between emerging Asia and the global 
economy.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a concise literature survey on the 
issues of decoupling and global business cycle synchronization. Section 3 examines the 
evolution of global macroeconomic interdependence through changing trade and 
financial linkages at both regional and global levels, and investigates the role of 
emerging Asia in shaping these changes and the rapidly changing global financial 
landscape that is being driven by financial technology and innovation. Section 4 employs 
a VAR model to evaluate the impact of ongoing changes in bi-directional linkages 
between emerging Asia and major industrial economies in terms of growth spillovers and 
business cycle synchronization. Concluding remarks follow in Section 5.  Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       3 
 
 
2.  Economic Integration and the Decoupling of Asia: 
Literature Survey   
2.1.   Economic Integration and Business Cycle Synchronization 
Theoretically, the effect of economic integration on business cycle co-movement is 
ambiguous. In the literature of international business cycles, trade is emphasized as an 
important channel of output co-movement. Greater trade integration stimulates the 
spillover of aggregate demand shocks, thereby increasing output co-movement (Frankel 
and Rose, 1998). The spread of technology shocks through trade can also make 
business cycles more correlated across countries (Canova and Dellas, 1993). In 
addition, spillovers can occur through a change in relative prices of factors and products. 
As much as countries trade freely, a positive shock in one country that raises the relative 
price of labor-intensive goods may lead to higher wages and employment throughout the 
world (Kraay and Ventra, 2002).  
On the other hand, as Krugman (1993) and Kose and Yi (2002) argue, more trade may 
encourage greater specialization of production, resulting in less synchronization of 
business cycles.
3 In this context, not just the magnitude of trade among countries, but 
also the similarity of production structures is considered to be important in explaining 
output co-fluctuations. Some studies found that when bilateral trade concentrates more 
on intra-industry trade, rather than inter-industry trade, the tendency of synchronizing 
output fluctuations strengthens (Imbs, 2004 and Shin and Wang, 2004). 
While the theoretical predictions remain varied and conflicting, most empirical studies 
find that business cycles are more synchronized as trade integration deepens (Frankel 
and Rose, 1998; and Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005).   
The link between financial integration and output co-movement is also not unambiguous. 
Kalemli–Ozcan et al. (2001) argue that better income insurance attained through greater 
capital market integration may lead to higher specialization of production and, hence, 
less symmetric output fluctuations. Financial integration can also facilitate the transfer of 
resources across countries, for example, by moving capital from a country with a 
negative shock to one with a positive shock, implying a negative output correlation. On 
the other hand, if capital flows are correlated internationally, closer financial integration 
leads to greater output synchronization (Imbs 2004). With imperfect information and/or 
liquidity constraints, investors’ herd behavior can cause them to withdraw capital from 
many countries simultaneously, contributing to positive output correlations, as observed 
during the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. In fact, Kim, Kim, and Wang (2007) showed 
that shocks to capital flows generated positive business cycle correlations for Asia–
Pacific countries. 
                                                           
3  Several studies emphasize the similarity of production structures as an important determinant of co-
movement of output. Industry-specific shocks can cause more business cycle synchronization among 
countries with similar production structures. Clark and van Wincoop (1999) and Imbs (2004) provide 
evidence that greater similarity in industry structure is associated with higher co-movement of output 
and employment. Imbs emphasizes that the effect of trade on business cycle synchronization is largely 
driven by intra-industry trade reflecting similar production structures. 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
Empirical evidence of the link between financial integration and business cycle co-
movement is also conflicting. Several studies, including Kalemli–Ozcan et al. (2001) and 
Heathcote and Perri (2002), present evidence that higher financial integration leads to a 
decline in the correlation of output. However, Imbs (2004, 2006) finds that the business 
cycles of countries with strong financial links are significantly more synchronized, even 
though they also tend to be more specialized.   
The effect of economic integration on business cycle co-movement also hinges on the 
broad macroeconomic policy environment. In an integrated region, policy makers can no 
longer pursue an optimal policy without taking account of neighbor countries’ actions. 
For example, with a tightly integrated capital market and a hard peg exchange rate 
regime, a small open economy must delegate its monetary policy to an anchor country’s 
central bank. In general, deeper integration necessitates further macroeconomic policy 
cooperation among policymakers in the integrated region in order to manage increasing 
macroeconomic interdependence more effectively.  
It is, however, an open question whether increased macroeconomic policy cooperation 
would increase or decrease the extent of output co-movement. For example, when 
national autonomy over monetary policy is sacrificed for the sake of a fixed exchange 
rate regime, pegging countries are subject to common monetary policy shocks. And with 
a pegged regime, real shocks to an economy are transmitted across countries to a larger 
extent without being mitigated by exchange rate movements. In this context, closer 
exchange and monetary policy cooperation can contribute to greater co-movement of 
output. However, arguments also run in the opposite direction. Outputs might move more 
asymmetrically in a financially integrated region with a fixed exchange rate regime if 
idiosyncratic domestic shocks are not dampened by independent monetary policy.   
2.2.   Empirical Studies on Output Co-movement in Asia 
Empirical studies differ on the extent and nature of business cycle co-movement among 
Asian economies. It appears that the choice of empirical methodology and sample has a 
major impact on the analytical results. 
While they vary, most empirical studies find that the degree of business cycle 
synchronization among Asian economies has been increasing, partly due to deepened 
trade integration. But, it is not conclusive whether the output of Asian economies has 
decoupled from, or become less interdependent with, the global economy.   
ADB (2007, 2008) reports that the correlation coefficients of Asian business cycles, 
among emerging Asian economies and with G3 economies, increased after the Asian 
financial crisis and have remained high. The high synchronicity between Asian business 
cycles and the G3 cycle is interpreted as evidence refuting the view of Asia decoupling. 
But, the increased correlation is only indicative since correlation can be spurious without 
clearly distinguishing regional shocks from global shocks.   
Several studies adopt dynamic factor models that can deconstruct an economy’s output 
fluctuations into contributions by different factors, including global, regional, and country 
specific factors. Moneta and Ruffer (2006) estimate various specifications of a dynamic Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       5 
 
 
factor model for the output of ten East Asian economies and find a significant common 
factor in their business cycles. Specifically, a considerable part of the common factor is 
the result of co-movement in exports, which, in turn, is attributed to a number of 
exogenous factors such as the price of oil price and JPY/USD exchange rate. But, they 
find Asian output is only weakly affected by developments in industrial countries.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) and Kose et al. (2008) find that global and 
regional common shocks have accounted for a sizable percentage of business cycle 
fluctuations in both industrial countries and emerging market economies (including 
emerging Asia), but the relative importance of the global factors has decreased, while 
that of regional factors has increased. The result supports the theory of decoupling, or 
divergence, between the business cycles of industrialized countries and emerging Asian 
economies. But, since the analysis of the IMF (2007) and Kose et al. (2008), as well as 
Moneta and Ruffer (2006), focus on the patterns in Asia’s business cycles over the past 
two decades, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis must have increased the influence of 
common regional shocks.  
Several studies adopt the VAR approach to disentangle the nature of shocks, and 
analyze output interdependence for East Asian economies. Kim and Lee (2008) find that 
the extent of output linkage increased substantially, both regionally and globally, after the 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The increase in the degree of regional dependence is 
similar in magnitude to increase in the degree of global dependence. ADB (2008) and 
Takagi and Kozuri (2008) also provide similar evidence that Asia’s output is responding 
significantly to both regional and global output shocks in the post-crisis period.    
3.  Evolution and Nature of Macroeconomic Interdependence  
3.1  Trends and Stylized Facts about Asian Business Cycles 
Regional integration has gained momentum in recent decades through advances in 
trade, finance, and macroeconomic links (ADB, 2008). The effect of strengthened trade 
and financial linkages on business cycle co-movements remains inconclusive on the 
theoretical and empirical fronts. However, the process of regional integration continues 
to reshape the dynamics of regional economies, both among themselves and with the 
rest of the world. The evolution of Asia’s business cycles will reflect these changes in 
intra- and inter-regional macroeconomic interdependence.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the movement of real GDP for Asian and G7 economies in terms of 
their growth rates. As Figure 2 shows, Asian business cycles are generally more volatile 
than their G7 counterparts, while the amplitude of Asian business cycles has dampened 
visibly over time. 
 
Judging from the patterns of growth fluctuations, Asian business cycles appear to have 
changed quite significantly after the 1997/98 financial crisis. In the post-crisis period, the 
cyclical movements of Asian economies have become more distinctive, although they 
tend to have longer expansionary periods followed by relatively shorter, albeit much 
sharper, contractions compared to G7 economies. Such a pattern was much more 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
pronounced during most of the 1990s, when the Asian regional economy experienced an 
extended period of rapid growth prior to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Although still 
exhibiting higher volatility than the G7, Asian business cycles have become much more 
stable in the post-crisis period. This may reflect the effects of post-crisis reforms and 
structural changes in the regional economy.
4  
 
The behavior of post-crisis Asian business cycles also resembles more closely that of 
the G7 cycles, in that they became more periodic in terms of upturns and downturns. A 
notable exception to this new pattern is the PRC. The Chinese economy appears to beat 
the business cycle with continued robust growth regardless of the ups and downs of the 
regional and international economy. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the correlation coefficients of Asian business cycles with each 
other and with the global economy for the pre-crisis (1990–1996) and post-crisis (2000–
2007) periods. The crisis period is omitted intentionally. A close look at the business 
cycle trend suggests significant differences in the co-movements of Asian business 
cycles—before and after the crisis—among themselves and with G7 economies. The 
1997/98 Asian financial crisis was perhaps the most significant common shock for Asian 
economies, leading to positive correlations during the crisis period. But the same event 
is likely to have dampened the correlation between the Asian and G7 business cycles. In 
order to assess the synchronicity of Asian business cycles without the crisis effect, the 
correlations for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are reported separately.  
 
Evidence based on the correlation analysis of business cycles supports the argument 
that there are higher degrees of both regional and international business cycle 
synchronization in the post-crisis period. The correlation analysis of the cyclical 
components shows that the correlations of Asian business cycles have increased 
markedly, both with each other and with the G7 cycles, when comparing the pre-crisis 
and the post-crisis periods.  
 
Table 1 presents the average of the bilateral correlations between all the pairs of nine 
Asian economies in the sample over the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. If the Asian 
business cycles co-move, then the average of the bilateral correlations would be high. A 
similar approach is taken to calculate the average correlations for the Asian economies 
excluding the PRC (AXC). For both Asia and AXC, the average correlations rose 
somewhat from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. This increased business cycle 
synchronization may reflect greater intra-regional integration. In both periods, the 
average correlation for AXC is higher than for Asia, suggesting that the PRC exhibits 
cyclical behavior that is relatively independent from the rest of the region. Interestingly, 
however, the average correlation grew faster among the Asian economies, including the 
PRC, than was the case with AXC. This suggests that the Chinese business cycle is 
increasingly moving in tandem with the rest of Asia’s. 
                                                           
4  Recent literature has noted a substantial decline in the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations in the 
developed world over the past two decades or so. Although much debate over the potential drivers of 
these changes is still ongoing, some studies suggest that the decline in volatility may be attributed to 
structural changes and economic reforms, particularly related to monetary policy regimes (Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler, 2000) and the role of deeper financial markets in helping households and firms 
smooth out expenditures in the face of fluctuating incomes (Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2005). Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       7 
 
 
Table 2 reports the correlations between Asian business cycles and the cycles of the G7, 
Japan, and the United States (US). Asian business cycles have generally been much 
more synchronized with G7 cycles in the post-crisis period. The only exception is the 
correlation between AXC and the G7, which decreased slightly from a relatively high pre-
crisis level. Again, the correlation between AXC and the G7 is higher than that between 
Asia and the G7 in the pre-crisis period. The higher correlation between AXC and the G7 
may be attributed to a Chinese business cycle that was generally independent from the 
G7 cycle in the pre-crisis period.  
 
While similar patterns apply to the correlations for both Asia and AXC with the US and 
Japan, business cycle co-movements between Asia and Japan have increased 
substantially more than co-movements between Asia and the US. The results suggest 
that Japan’s integration with the regional economy is an important driver behind the 
increase in inter-regional business cycle correlations. Given its geographical proximity, 
Japan is expected to be more integrated with the rest of Asia than any other G7 
economy. But it appears that Japan is still less integrated with the rest of Asia than the 
US is integrated with Asia. Nonetheless, in the last decade, Japan has significantly 
increased its level of integration with the rest of Asia, particularly with the PRC.   
 
The correlations of the PRC’s business cycles with the cycles of the rest of Asia, the G7, 
Japan, and the US are shown separately in Table 3. This confirms that the PRC’s cyclical 
behavior is quite different from both the regional and G7 business cycles. The 
correlations of the PRC’s cycles with both regional and G7 cycles are relatively low, 
although they have increased significantly in the post-crisis period. The results also 
suggest that the Chinese economy is increasingly integrated with the rest of the region 
and Japan. The post-crisis correlations for the rest of Asia and Japan with the PRC are 
significantly higher than the pre-crisis correlations, while the increases in these 
correlations are greater than the increases in the correlations for the G7 and US with the 
PRC. 
 
3.2 Trade  Linkages 
The Asian economy is generally more open than other groupings of countries in the 
world, and trade linkages within the region have been growing much more strongly in 
recent years. The total exports of emerging Asian economies grew from $419 billion in 
1990 to $2,995 billion in 2007. The region’s export-to-GDP ratio now reaches 50%, 
which is up from 34% in 1990. Total trade as a percentage of GDP grew from 69% to 
95% over the same period, while the share of intra-regional trade in total GDP increased 
from 21% to 38%, reflecting the increasing economic and trade integration of emerging 
Asian economies (Figure 3).  
 
Asia’s increasing trade openness has been accompanied by significant progress in the 
diversification of its export base. Figure 4 shows the composition of Asian exports by 
destination. The share of intra-regional trade in total exports rose from about 31% in 
1990 to 41% in 2007. The geographical composition of Asia’s export market has become 
much more diversified. The share of exports to G7 markets has declined significantly, 
accounting for only 32% of Asia’s total exports in 2007, which is down from 49% in 1990. 
The share of exports to the US—emerging Asia’s single largest market—fell to 15% from 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
The share of exports to the US—emerging Asia’s single largest market—fell to 15% from 
22% over the same period.  
 
The popular hypothesis of decoupling has also drawn on the idea that strengthening 
regional ties might help cushion emerging Asia amid a slowdown in the US and other 
major industrial economies. There is little doubt that emerging Asian economies are 
increasingly integrated through growing intra-regional trade, investment, and financial 
linkages. The rapid expansion of intra-regional trade suggests that the Asian economy 
has strengthened its regional economic ties. At the same time, the relative decline in its 
trade with the rest of the world suggests Asia’s reliance on external trading partners 
might be diminishing.  
 
However, changing demand conditions in the world’s major economies, particularly the 
US, appear to represent a dominant factor behind Asia’s export growth. Figure 5 
demonstrates the tight relationship between US non-oil import growth and Asian exports. 
Although the share of the US market in terms of Asia’s total exports is on the decline, 
Figure 5 indicates that the relationship has strengthened over time. The pre- and post-
crisis correlations between the growth rates of US non-oil imports and Asian exports 
confirm that this linkage is significant and tighter in the post-crisis period. 
 
Underlying this strong linkage is the nature of intra-Asian trade, a marked feature of  
which is that it is driven by vertical integration of production chains whose final output is 
exported outside the region. Figure 6 shows a breakdown of Asian exports between 
those destined for other countries within the region and those that leave the region. The 
information for Figure 6 was taken from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
database.
5 Intra-regional trade within Asia is then factored into the region’s final demand, 
as well as what is used in the production process. A similar deconstruction is made for 
trade among the rest of the world. On both ends of Figure 6, total final demand by 
different regions is reported, taking into account the trade of intermediate goods in the 
production process. Based on this analysis, about 60% of all Asian exports are 
eventually consumed by G3 countries (instead of about 32% of total exports listed 
above). The results suggest that G7 countries still remain the main export destination for 
final goods departing from Asian ports when taking into account the share of 
intermediate goods that are traded for assembly and production within the region before 
being shipped out of the region. 
 
This export dynamic is also confirmed by other sources. The Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (2003) estimated that only about 22% of total Asian exports are eventually 
absorbed by the region’s domestic demand, based on the 1995 Asian Input–Output table 
(AIO table).
6 Meng et. al. (2006) showed that the dependence of Asian production on 
overseas markets has strengthened rather than weakened between 1995 and 2000, 
                                                           
5  The GTAP database (version 7) corresponds to the world economy in 2004. The database provides 
“detailed bilateral trade characterizing economic linkages among regions, together with individual 
country input–output databases, which account for inter-sectoral linkages within regions” (Hertel 1998, 
p.2). This version disaggregates the world economy into 113 countries/regions (including all nine 
economies in East and Southeast Asia under this study) and 57 sectors. 
6  Citibank (2006) updated the result based on the newly released 2000 AIO table and reported that only 
11% of Asian exports are destined for regional demand. Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       9 
 
 
based on the comparison of the 2000 AIO table with the 1995 AIO table. Pula and 
Peltonen (2008) also concluded that intra-regional trade (including Chinese markets) is 
responsible for only 7% of the region’s overall GDP, using the country-level update of the 
AIO table for 2006, while G3 countries account for 16%. 
 
Given that intra-Asian trade has been significantly bolstered by demand from outside the 
region, the growth of intra-regional trade’s share in total Asian exports does not 
automatically lead to Asia’s independence from the effects of an external demand shock. 
Contrarily, to the extent that intra-regional trade is dictated by intra-industry processing 
and assembly through vertically integrated production chains, the regional Asian 
economy can be highly sensitive to an external shock, particularly an industry-specific 
one that emanates from major demand destinations. The US slowdown in 2001/02 
originated within the information technology (IT) industry and its ripple effects through 
the global IT industry, including Asian manufacturers, was a vivid example of such 
sensitivity.  
 
3.3 Financial  Spillovers 
The recent US subprime turmoil and its ripple effects in global financial markets illustrate 
the advanced nature of financial globalization. Rapid financial innovation has also 
contributed to cross-border financial integration in recent years, which has gathered 
pace since the early 1990s along with financial deregulation and capital account 
liberalization.  
Global financial market co-movement has increased significantly in recent years. Figure 
7 shows stock market correlations for emerging Asia and the PRC with the US. Stock 
market correlations between emerging Asia and the US reached very high levels in the 
late 1990s through the mid-2000s. Given the predominant influence of the US stock 
market in the global financial system, emerging Asia’s stock markets tend to track very 
closely with changes in the US market. On the other hand, stock market correlations 
between the PRC and the US were low until the mid-2000s before rising sharply in the 
past few years.  
 
The strong rise in global market correlations can be attributed to greater financial 
openness since the 1990s. Capital flows to and from the region reached record highs in 
recent years (Figure 8). With the volume of cross-border capital flows also on the rise, 
cross-border holdings of financial assets increased sharply (Figure 9). The region’s 
gross external assets and liabilities as a share of GDP reached 215% in 2006, up from 
158% in 1990 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006). The secular trend of cross-border 
financial holdings has been driven by some notable changes in global financial systems, 
including the spread of securitization, rise of hedge funds and institutional investors, and 
use of offshore special purpose vehicles by banks and non-bank financial institutions.  
The process of cross-border financial integration has also accelerated at the regional 
level. Figure 10  shows the average of pairwise stock market correlations among 
emerging Asian economies, which illustrates the rise in regional stock market co-
movements in recent years, especially with respect to the PRC. Similarly, Figure 11 
shows the average standard deviation of government bond yields, indicating 10          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
convergence among regional bond yields. The region’s portfolio investment in regional 
assets also rose significantly from about 15% of total assets in 2001 to about 28% in 
2007, while G7 economies’ account of the region’s liabilities declined from about 68% to 
about 55% over the same period (Figure 12).  
The level of regional financial integration in emerging Asia still lags behind Asian 
integration with global markets. For example, stock market correlations at the regional 
level are generally lower than those with the US. Furthermore, emerging Asia still 
allocates more of its portfolio investment in G7 economies than within the region’s 
economies. This is despite the fact that regional authorities have made conscious efforts 
to strengthen regional financial links by removing barriers to the cross-border flow of 
capital and financial services, improving the cross-border information and 
communications flow, and promoting the harmonization of financial rules and standards.  
Growing foreign participation in local capital markets also makes the region’s financial 
markets vulnerable to changes in global financial market conditions, including sudden 
swings in investor sentiment. In a climate of heightened uncertainty, a sudden shift in the 
direction and magnitude of financial flows is a significant concern. Higher cross-border 
holdings of financial assets raise the level of vulnerability to sharp adjustments in the 
valuation of global financial assets. International institutional investors could unwind their 
positions in emerging markets when liquidity conditions deteriorate in their home 
countries. A sharp reversal in risk appetite could also trigger a sudden reversal of capital 
flows and, of particular concern, involve a potential unwinding of carry trades (Lee and 
Park, 2008). 
 
There is little doubt that global financial turbulence, particularly from the US market, 
travels rapidly around the globe. In globalized finance, a swing in market sentiment could 
also hurt local companies’ funding conditions and, hence, investment decisions. Tighter 
credit conditions—together with elevated funding costs—and increased financial market 
volatility could squeeze funding for corporate investment, particularly in the developing 
world where the business environment remains less friendly. Recently, risk premiums for 
emerging Asian debt and the cost of protecting against their corporate default rose 
sharply, reflecting heightened investor anxiety and financial uncertainty. A worsening of 
the situation in global financial markets could make the region’s funding conditions more 
difficult, potentially dampening corporate profits and affecting broader economic activity. 
 
The considerable differences in the degree of financial integration and asset and liability 
positions at the regional and global levels imply that the effects of financial transmission 
on regional and global business cycles may be quite dubious. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible to expect that generally stronger global financial market integration could drive 
global, rather than regional, business cycle co-movements.    
 
3.4  The Rise of Asia and its Impact on the World 
With Asia’s share of world output growing rapidly, the region plays an increasingly 
important role in global trade, finance, and economic output. While trade and financial 
flows are important factors for macroeconomic interdependence, the direction and 
magnitude of these flows is changing rapidly with the rise of emerging Asia.  Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       11 
 
 
Emerging Asia’s rapid economic and structural transformation will also likely spur 
competition in trade and investment, which in turn affects global business cycles. The 
level and composition of international trade mirrors changing economic and industrial 
structures in emerging Asia (ADB, 2007). A closer look at trade flows reveals that Asian 
economies are undergoing a transformation with respect to their position in the world 
economy. Rapid economic development in relatively resource poor countries 
accompanied a change in export composition from agricultural products to 
manufactures. Along with a rise in the availability of skilled labor, the composition of 
manufactured exports is also shifting from labor-intensive to more skill-intensive 
products. These evolving structural changes in Asian economies are exerting 
considerable influence on world trade flows and global business cycles. 
 
Fast-growing Asian economies, with their potentially large spending power, are providing 
additional sources of global demand. Per capita income is an important variable for 
demand in global markets. Proponents of the theory of decoupling have argued that 
these new sources of demand coming from emerging Asia may help the global economy 
weather the adverse consequences of a US slowdown. Figure 13 illustrates the growing 
importance of emerging Asian economies, particularly the PRC, as destinations for G7 
and US exports. Although the G7’s export reliance on emerging Asia remains relatively 
small, the share of G7 exports destined for the PRC has visibly increased since 2000. 
 
Another important factor contributing to increased co-movements between Asian and G7 
business cycles is the nature of Japan’s integration with emerging Asia. Changing 
patterns of business cycles have accompanied greater co-movements between Japan 
and emerging Asia in recent years, particularly the PRC (Tables 2 and 3). Asia’s trade 
with Japan in terms of the share of GDP has either been stable or declined modestly 
over the past few decades. However, trade patterns between Japan and emerging Asia 
have been changing rapidly, as Japanese firms build production and procurement 
networks across the region. Figure 14 shows the increase in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows from Japan to the PRC, reflecting this trend of setting up a local 
manufacturing base. Although the share of FDI flows from Japan has been relatively 
small in terms of total FDI flows to the PRC, it has been growing quite rapidly, and now 
outweighs the US share. For the rest of Asia, the size of FDI inflows is also quite 
significant relative to the size of the host economy. With the growing presence of 
Japanese firms’ local manufacturing bases in emerging Asia, particularly in the PRC, 
bilateral trade between Japan and emerging Asia is declining. However, the sharing of 
production networks between Japan and emerging Asia leaves them exposed to the 
same industry or external demand shocks, thus leading to an increase in business cycle 
co-movements between Japan and the region.  
Emerging Asia is also considered a major player in the global financial system based on 
high levels of regional savings. Since the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, emerging Asia 
has accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves valued at over USD3 trillion. And 
on the back of such large reserve holdings, some countries in the region have 
established, or more actively managed, sovereign wealth funds in recent years. The 
pattern of global payment imbalances also suggests that emerging Asia finances a 
significant share of US current account deficits. Figure 15, for example, show a 
substantial rise in emerging Asia’s holdings of US Treasuries. 12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
There are also signs that emerging Asia exerts increasing influence on key prices in G7 
economies, such as imported goods, wages, exchange rates, and interest rates. Shocks 
from emerging Asia can be transmitted to G7 economies through price changes, leading 
to the synchronization of business cycles between emerging Asia and G7 economies. 
For example, a positive supply shock in the PRC can lower the price of imported goods 
in G7 economies, leading to higher real wages and employment among the G7.  
  
Technological advances and productivity growth, along with the industrialization process, 
are often important factors in business cycle patterns. Technological advances in an 
emerging economy can arise from innovation or from the imitation of existing 
technologies found elsewhere. For emerging Asian economies lacking indigenous 
technological innovation, the imitation and adaptation of advanced technologies 
developed in G7 countries has traditionally played a major role in technology growth. 
However, in recent years Asian economies have realized productivity gains through the 
creation of indigenous new technologies.
7 As a result, the vibrant and integrated Asian 
region is increasingly contributing to global productivity growth.  
 
 As the share of emerging Asia’s economy in the world economy continues to increase, 
Asian economies are having greater influences on demand, technology, and price 
variables in G7 markets, leading to closer synchronization of business cycles between 
emerging Asia and G7 economies.  
 
Asian economies have become the major source of additional demand for many primary 
commodities (Park and Zhai, 2007). In the past, commodity price fluctuations were 
dictated primarily by demand from major industrialized countries, which then caused 
spillover effects on the economic performance of developing countries. Driven by rapid 
income growth and economic development, however, emerging Asia has surfaced as a 
major demand force behind the price dynamics of primary commodities. The region is 
exerting increasing—and now considerable—influence on international commodity 
markets and prices.  
 
Figure 16 illustrates evolving correlations between GDP growth rates of both G7 and 
emerging Asian economies and commodity price fluctuations. While the linkage between 
G7 growth and the global commodity price cycle gradually weakened, the linkage 
between developing Asia’s growth and global commodity price fluctuations jumped 
beginning in the early 1990s. It can be inferred that strong growth in emerging Asia’s 
demand was a major driver behind an upswing in commodity markets through the mid-
1990s prior to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, while the crisis itself led to a slump in 
commodity markets in 1998/99.  
 
Such trends are set to intensify as the region's economic growth and development 
continue to be tightly associated with rapid industrialization, urbanization, and massive 
infrastructure investments, which are all resource-intensive. And it is clear that the 
region’s rapidly growing demand for resources will exert significant influence on global 
                                                           
7  The available US patent ownership data, which is often used for international comparisons of 
innovative outputs, shows that emerging Asian economies, especially the Republic of Korea and 
Taipei,China, have substantially increased their share of global patents. See USPTO, “Patents counts 










commodity prices. However, at least in theory, in terms of global business cycle co-
movements, the overall effect of higher correlations between Asian business cycles and 
global commodity prices remains ambiguous. For example, a boom in Asian economies 
will lead to higher commodity prices, which could slow economic activity globally. Again, 
deciphering the effect of growing Asian influence on the global business cycle is 
ultimately an empirical question. 
4. Empirical  Analysis 
4.1.   Panel VAR Model 
 
To examine the issue, we use VAR models. VAR models can identify the relevant 
structural shocks, such as global and regional shocks, and analyze the effects of each 
shock on an individual variable in a systematic way. We use panel structure to increase 
the degree of freedom because sample periods under consideration are relatively short.  
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where G(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L,    is an m×1 data vector, d
i is an 
m×1 constant matrix, m is the number of variables in the model, and    denotes a vector 
of structural disturbances. By assuming that structural disturbances are mutually 
uncorrelated,         can be denoted by Λ, which is a diagonal matrix where diagonal 
elements are the variances of structural disturbances. The individual fixed effect, d
i, is 
introduced to control for the country specific factors that are not included in the model. 
We are interested in examining the time-series relationship. Therefore, by including the 
individual fixed effect, we exclude the cross-sectional information in the estimation. 
 
We pooled the data and estimated the following reduced form panel VAR with the 
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where c
i is an m×1 constant matrix, B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, and 
. ) var( Σ =
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There are several ways of recovering the parameters in the structural form equation from 
the estimated parameters in the reduced form equation. The identification schemes 
under consideration impose recursive zero restrictions on contemporaneous structural 
parameters by applying Cholesky decomposition to the reduced form residuals, Λ, as in 
Sims (1980).  14          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
4.2.   Empirical Model 
To examine the relationship between global and Asian regional output, and their effects 
on the output of individual Asian economies, we constructed a three variable VAR model 
[log RY_W, log RY_A, log RYi] where the contemporaneously exogenous variables are 
ordered first: RY_W is the world aggregate output, RY_A is the East Asian aggregate 
output, and RYi is an individual output of an East Asian economy. The first two variables 
are included to examine the relationship between global and Asian regional output. The 
last variable is included to examine the effects of global and Asian regional output on the 
output of individual East Asian economies. The ordering of the variables can be 
regarded as a natural one. World aggregate output is treated as contemporaneously 
exogenous to regional aggregate output and individual country output. Regional 
aggregate output is treated as contemporaneously exogenous to individual country 
output.  
The world aggregate is constructed as the aggregate of G7 countries. The Asian 
aggregate is constructed as the aggregate of nine emerging Asian economies (China, 
People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; 
Philippines, Singapore, Taipei,China; and Thailand), while excluding each country’s own 
economy. 
 
We also construct a three-variable system in order to examine the role of the PRC. The 
variables are log RY_W, log RY_C, and log RYi. The contemporaneously exogenous 
variables are ordered first and RY_C is the Chinese output. Again, the ordering of the 
variables can be regarded as a natural one. World aggregate output is treated as 
contemporaneously exogenous to Chinese output and individual country output. Chinese 
output is treated as contemporaneously exogenous to other individual country outputs 
since the Chinese economy is far larger than other emerging Asian economies. The 
world aggregate is constructed as the aggregate of G7 countries. The Asian aggregate is 
constructed as the aggregate of eight emerging Asian economies (excluding the PRC)  
 
We use quarterly data and estimate the model for two sample periods: the period before 
the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis (1
st quarter 1990–4
th quarter 1996) and the period after 
the crisis (1
st quarter 2000–2
nd quarter 2007). A constant term and two lags are 
assumed. As the measure of output, real GDP is used. Since we are interested in 
business cycle phenomenon, we exclude the trend from data by applying an H-P filter for 
each sub-period.  
 
4.3. Results   
 
Figures 17 and 18 report the impulse responses for 16 quarters—for the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods, respectively—with 90% probability bands in the case of [log RY_W, 
log RY_A, log RYi. The responding variables are denoted at the far left of each row of 
graphs, while the names of shocks are denoted at the top of each column of graphs. The 
numbers show percentage changes. 
 
Impulse responses show that the effects of global shocks on the Asian aggregate and 
individual economies increased substantially in the 2000s. While the effects are minor in Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       15 
 
 
the 1990s, the effects become significantly stronger in the 2000s. In the 2000s, in 
response to global shocks, G7 output increases about 0.35% on impact, decreases over 
time, and returns to the initial level in 3 years. This reveals the nature of global shocks. 
In response to global shocks, the Asian aggregate output and individual output increase 
0.2%–0.3% on impact, decreases over time, and returns to the initial level in 2–3years. 
 
The effects of emerging Asian shocks on the global economy also increased 
substantially in the 2000s. While the effects are small and much delayed in the 1990s, 
the effects are far larger in the 2000s when, in response to Asian aggregate shocks, the 
Asian aggregate increases about 0.4% on impact, decreases over time, and returns to 
the initial level in 5 years. Compared to the global shocks, Asian aggregate shocks are 
larger and more persistent. In response to Asian aggregate shocks, G7 output increases 
over time. The peak increase of about 0.3% is realized in 2 years before returning to the 
initial level in 7 years. Individual output increases about 0.2% on impact and decreases 
back to the initial level in 5 years. It is particularly interesting that Asian aggregate 
shocks have such strong effects on the global economy in the 2000s. 
To infer the role of global and regional shocks in output fluctuations, forecast error 
variance decomposition is reported in Figures 19 and 20. The graphs in each row show 
the percentage contribution of three shocks to fluctuations in each variable. The point 
estimate and 90% error bands are reported. From the graphs, we can infer that the role 
of global shocks in explaining Asian aggregate output and individual country output 
increased substantially in the 2000s, as did the role of Asian aggregate shocks in 
explaining global and individual output. The contribution of global shocks to Asian 
aggregate output fluctuations increases from less than 10% in the 1990s to about 20% in 
the 2000s. The contribution of global shocks in explaining individual Asian output was 
less than 5% in the 1990s, but over 10% in the 2000s. The contribution of Asian 
aggregate shocks in explaining global output fluctuations (at medium- and long-term 
horizons) increases from less than 20% in the 1990s to about 50% in the 2000s. The 
contribution of Asian aggregate shocks in explaining individual output fluctuations also 
increases from less than 5% to over 20%.  
It is quite striking that the proportion of Asian aggregate output shocks in explaining 
global output fluctuations is huge (about 50%) in the 2000s, which is far larger than the 
proportion of global shocks in explaining Asian aggregate output fluctuations (about 
20%). Also, the proportion of Asian aggregate output shocks in explaining individual 
country output fluctuations is larger than that of global shocks. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that the Asian economy influences the global economy far more than 
the other way around. From the impulse responses, we can see that the size and 
persistence of Asian aggregate shocks are larger than those of global shocks. If the 
nature of the global shocks and Asian aggregate shocks are the same, the effect of 
Asian aggregate shocks on the global economy may not be far larger than the effect of 
global shocks on the Asian economy. To some extent, the fact that Asian aggregate 
shocks were larger and more persistent than global shocks may explain the finding that 
the contribution of Asian aggregate shocks to global and individual output fluctuations is 
far larger than that of global shocks to Asian aggregate and individual output 
fluctuations. Even after considering this difference in the nature of shocks, the huge 
effect of Asian aggregate shocks on the global economy is still quite interesting. 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
Figures 21 and 22 show the impulse responses for the model with the PRC included. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the previous model with Asian aggregate shocks in 
that the positive effects of global shocks on Chinese and individual Asian economies, 
and the positive effects of Chinese shocks on global and individual Asian economies, are 
larger in the 2000s than in the 1990s. Also, Chinese shocks are larger and more 
persistent than global shocks.  
Figures 23 and 24 show the results of forecast error variance decomposition. The results 
are again qualitatively similar to the previous model with Asian aggregate shocks. The 
contribution of global shocks on the PRC and individual Asian economies, and the 
contribution of Chinese shocks on global and individual Asian economies, are far larger 
in the 2000s than in the 1990s.  
Our empirical finding of the huge effects of the PRC and Asian economies on the global 
economy may depend on how to construct the global aggregate. Especially interesting is 
whether to include Japan in the global aggregate because the PRC and Asian 
economies may have a relatively stronger effect on Japan than other major industrial 
countries. To examine such a possibility, we also construct the model with a “G6” 
aggregate (i.e., the G7 countries excluding Japan). 
Figures 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 show impulse responses for the 1990s and 
the 2000s using the G6 aggregate. As in the model with the G7 aggregate, the (positive) 
effects of global shocks on the Asian aggregate and Chinese output are larger in the 
2000s than in the 1990s. In addition, the (positive) effects of the Asian aggregate and 
Chinese shocks on the global economy tend to be larger in the 2000s than in the 1990s.  
From impulse responses in the 2000s, the (positive) effect of global shocks on Asian 
aggregate output is larger in this model than in the model with the G7 aggregate. But the 
effect of Asian aggregate shocks and Chinese shocks on global output is smaller in the 
2000s. As a result, in this model the variance decomposition for the 2000s shows a 
larger role for global shocks in explaining Asian and Chinese output fluctuations than in 
the model with the G7 aggregate, and a smaller role for Asian and Chinese output 
shocks in explaining global output fluctuations. In this model, global shocks explain a 
large degree of Asian aggregate output, but Asian aggregate shocks explain only a small 
degree of global output fluctuations (less than 10%). For the model with Chinese output, 
such a tendency is also found, albeit a weaker one than in the previous G7 model.  
To summarize, the effects of global shocks on the PRC and emerging Asian economies 
increased substantially in the 2000s to the point that global shocks explain a substantial 
part of fluctuations in the Chinese and Asian economies during this period, ranging from 
20% to 40%, depending on the model specifications. The effects of the Chinese and 
emerging Asian economies on the global economy also increased in the 2000s. The 
exact effect depends largely on whether Japan is included as a part of the global 
economy. With Japan, the effects are huge, surpassing the effects of global shocks on 
the Chinese and emerging Asian economies. Without Japan, the effects become smaller 
than the effects of global shocks on the Chinese and emerging Asian economies.  Emerging Asia: Decoupling or Recoupling  |       17 
 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
Traditionally, the macroeconomic relationship between developing and developed 
countries was characterized by uni-directional dependence—often dubbed the “North–
South relationship”—with cyclical fluctuations and growth in the South (developing 
countries) being determined primarily by the developments in the North (developed 
countries). But, with the growing influence of emerging Asia, the North–South 
relationship between emerging Asia and industrialized countries is likely to take on a 
new pattern of bi-directional interdependence. Heated debates on decoupling also 
center on the notion that emerging Asia, on the back of the rapidly growing regional 
economy, should be able to provide a new engine of global growth and challenge the old 
paradigm of the North–South relationship.  
This paper has explored the nature and evolution of macroeconomic interdependence 
between emerging Asian and G7 economies. We have found that while the effects of 
global shocks on emerging Asian and Chinese economies increased substantially, the 
effects of the Chinese and emerging Asian economies on the global economy also 
increased in the 2000s.  
It is undeniable that Asia has made remarkable progress in regional economic, trade, 
and financial integration. But the process of economic integration within Asia is also 
tightly linked to global integration, rather than signaling a departure from it. The analysis 
of business cycle co-movements, both within Asia and between Asia and G7 countries, 
generally affirms the global nature of the regionalization of economic activities in Asia.  
As shocks from emerging Asian economies have a greater positive influence on global 
economies, emerging Asia and G7 economies have been recoupling, rather than 
decoupling, with each other. The growing influence of Asia and the PRC, tightening intra- 
and inter-regional trade linkages, and the globalization of financial markets are 
combining to make fundamental changes to the nature of macroeconomic 
interdependence and growth spillovers between emerging Asia and the industrial 
countries of the G7. 
Increasing macroeconomic interdependence between emerging Asian and major 
industrial economies has far-reaching implications for the region as well as the global 
economy. Greater economic interdependence and tighter trade linkages among Asian 
economies, as well as between Asia and the world, require greater cooperation in trade, 
finance, and exchange rate policies at both the regional and global levels.  
As economic and financial shocks travel rapidly from a country to its trading partners 
through increased trade and financial linkages at the regional level, it is in the common 
interest of all Asian countries to maintain sound macroeconomic conditions and prudent 
economic management at the national level. Synchronization of real growth and inflation 
in the region should also generate regional common interests to ensure close 
cooperation in macroeconomic and exchange rate policies.  
Greater global integration also necessitates closer policy cooperation at the global level 
to respond more effectively to shocks and crises in global and regional markets. The 18          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
growing influence of the PRC and Asia necessitates an amplification of Asia’s voice in 
global forums and institutions. Asia will likely exercise increasing leadership in global 
decision making, while also being asked to be a cooperative and responsible partner in 
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Figure 5: Correlation between Growth in Emerging Asian  
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Figure 11: Average Standard Deviation of Asian Government  






Figure 12: Emerging Asia's Portfolio Investment  
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            Figure 14: Foreign Direct Investment to the People’s Republic of China 
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RY_G7I = aggregate output of G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United 
States); RY_A9I = aggregate output of nine emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic of; Hong 
Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand); 
RYI = output of individual emerging Asian economies. 
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PRC = People’s Republic of China 
RY_G7I = aggregate output of G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United 
States); RY_CI = output of the PRC; RYI = output of individual emerging Asian economies (China, People’s 
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RY_A9I = aggregate output of nine emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand); RYI = 
output of individual emerging Asian economies. 
 
 






























































































RY_G6I = aggregate output of G6 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States); 
RY_A9I = aggregate output of nine emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand); RYI = 
output of individual emerging Asian economies. 34          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 31 
 
Figure 27: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, the Model with Asian 
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China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand); RYI = 
output of individual emerging Asian economies. 
 
 
Figure 28: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, the Model with Asian 
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RY_A9I = aggregate output of nine emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand); RYI = 
output of individual emerging Asian economies. 
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RY_G6I = aggregate output of G6 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States); 
RY_CI = output of the PRC; RYI = output of individual emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic 
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Figure 31: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, the Model with the PRC and 
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Figure 32: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, the Model with the PRC and 









































































RY_G6I = aggregate output of G6 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States); 
RY_CI = output of the PRC; RYI = output of individual emerging Asian economies (China, People’s Republic 
of; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and 
Thailand). 
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Asia 0.000  0.448 
Asia excluding PRC




Table 2: Inter-regional Business Cycle Correlations 
 
 Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Asia-G7 0.084  0.611 
Asia-US 0.233  0.715 
Asia-Japan -0.618  0.647 
Asia excluding PRC-G7  0.619  0.537 
Asia excluding PRC-US  -0.345  0.724 




Table 3: Business Cycle Correlations with the People’s Republic of China 
 
 Pre-crisis  Post-crisis 
Asia excluding PRC  -0.379  0.549 
G7 -0.304  0.580 
US 0.490  0.517 
Japan -0.633  0.477 
 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Note: Asia comprises China, People’s Republic of; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. 
1  GDP cyclical component–calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter method on the natural log of real GDP 
in local currency–was used to compute the business cycle correlations. 
2  Pre-crisis period= 1990Q1–1996Q4. 
3  Post-crisis period= 2000Q1–2007Q2. 
Source: Oxford Economics, Quarterly Model, August 2008.  
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